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Abstract
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if
players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in
games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place.
Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play
captures talk about past commitments. We focus on equilibria where mes-
sages are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's
Stag Hunt game we nd that communication is useless if talk is about com-
mitments, while the ecient outcome is selected if talk is about intentions.
This conrms intuition and empirical ndings in the literature.
We develop a theory of credible communication under complete in-
formation and connect it to the notion of credibility in standard sender-
receiver games.
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1 Introduction
Game theory is agnostic about how to play in games that have multiple Nash
equilibria. Beliefs can be mutually self-conrming when all believe that others
focus on an inecient equilibrium even if there are alternative Nash equilibria
where all are strictly better o. Yet, it is commonly believed that inecient
equilibria will not be played when players are allowed to communicate before
they play the game. The reasoning is that it suces that one player proposes an
equilibrium outcome in which all players are better o to upset beliefs associated
to inecient play (see (Rabin,1994)).
At the same time Aumann (1990) claims that communication can be useless
even in the simplest games, and illustrates this informally in a version of the Stag
Hunt game. Farrell (1988)1 objects and argues for this game that it depends
on when communication takes place. If communication occurs after the person
communicating has made a choice then he agrees. However, if communication
occurs before making a choice then he argues that communication will lead all
players to hunt the stag. Charness (2000) runs experiments for this game that
reinforce the intuition of Farrell.
We present a simple formal framework to examine credible communication,
where players are believed whenever possible, in two person normal form games.
Simply adding cheap talk will not reduce the set of equilibrium outcomes. A
necessary condition for upsetting beliefs supporting an inecient equilibrium is
that alternative proposals can be made. These would be initiated by sending
unanticipated messages, naturally accompanied by an explanation of the circum-
stances surrounding the new proposal. One would also explain which messages
one would have sent if one had other intentions or the circumstances would be
dierent. For communication to then be successful the parties involved, both
those that talk and those that listen, must be able and willing to rethink their
intentions.
We embed these ingredients into a standard game theory analysis, by setting
up the rules of communication and adding features to the strategic interaction
that capture what happens when one explains behavior under alternative circum-
stances. In our analysis we then only consider those equilibria where messages
are believed whenever possible.
We consider two dierent ways of adding communication to a two-player bi-
matrix game. In both cases the communication protocol is chosen to be as simple
as possible, player one sends a single message and player two just listens. In the
rst variation, player one sends the message before either has chosen an action
(referred to as Talk and Play, abbreviated by TP). In the second variation player
one sends the message after he has chosen his own action, which is not observable
by player two, and before player two has made a choice (Play then Talk, PT).
1This is based on earlier personal communication on this matter, see Farell (1988).
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In both variations the message is sent from a given language, which is chosen
by one of the players, who we call the interpreter. A language is dened as
a partition2 of player one's action set. The elements of the partitions are the
messages among which player one can choose one and send it to player two.
There are two languages of particular interest. We call the language complete
communication if each action of player one is associated to a message, which
means that the language is given by the nest partition of the set of actions. We
refer to no communication if the language only has a single message, this message
is then equal to the entire set of actions.
Given a xed language, our solution concepts for the enlarged games stipulates
that all (even out of equilibrium) messages of the language are truthful and
believed by player two if it is possible, otherwise all messages are ignored. More
precisely, if, given that player two believes that player one tells the truth (in PT
about which action he has chosen, in TP which action he will choose) and player
one has no strict incentives to lie, then we require that all messages from the
given language are believed by player two and that player one tells the truth.
However, as messages can be vague about which action will be (TP) or has been
(PT) chosen, in games in which player one has more than two actions, credibility
will depend on the beliefs of player two about the action chosen by player one
that is consistent with truth-telling for the given message.
Truth-telling in TP means that player one chooses an action within the mes-
sage he has sent. Truth-telling in PT means that player one sends the message
which contains the action he has chosen. Player two believes a message if her
belief is supported within that message. We say that a language is credible if
there is a weak-perfect Bayesian equilibrium3 of the enlarged game (in which
that language is xed) such that player one always tells the truth and player two
believes each message of player one.
The equilibrium concepts when the language is not xed but is chosen by the
interpreter are called TPE and PTE respectively. Both TPE and PTE are dened
just simply as weak-perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the enlarged games such
that if a credible language is chosen then player one must tell the truth and player
two must (correctly) believe it. In case of non-credible languages player two plays
as if the language no communication was chosen, that is, she ignores all messages
coming from non-credible languages.
We now return to our motivating question, whether communication leads to
2See the discussion where we justify this assumption using Rabin's (1990) Message Prole
Theory.
3In fact, under TP we require correct beliefs out of equilibrium, hence we require a subgame
perfect equilibrium. See the discussion on this issue.
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eciency. Consider the Aumann's Stag Hunt game:
Player one
Player two
S R
S 9; 9 0; 8
R 8; 0 7; 7
The analysis of this game reveals that communication helps players to coordinate
on hunting the stag under TP but that it is useless, and hence unable to rene the
set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, under PT. Consider TP. If player one says Stag
and player two believes it then player two plays Stag and hence player one plays
Stag. If player one says Rabbit and player two believes it then player two plays
Rabbit and hence player one plays Rabbit. Hence complete communication is
credible. No communication is always credible. Now no matter how players play
when the language no communication was chosen, player one as the interpreter
can choose the language complete communication send the message Stag and
receives the payo 9. In any TP equilibrium players go for the stag. On the
contrary, complete communication is not credible under PT. If player one has
chosen Rabbit, and player two believes him, then it is optimal for him to lie and
to send the message Stag. Only no communication is credible and PT does not
rene away any of the Nash equilibria.
This result conrms the intuition of Farrell (1988) and the ndings of Charness
(2000) and does not depend on which player is assigned as the interpreter (which
is not true in general). In particular, communication does not necessarily lead to
ecient outcomes under PT but it does in this game under TP.
Interestingly we also nd that eciency need not result under TP. We present
a simple 3 by 3 game of common interest in which the action associated to the
unique ecient outcome is contained in the support of any Nash equilibrium.
The message that implies that player one will not choose this action is not be-
lievable. Consequently only no communication is credible and inecient play can
be supported. On the other hand, if one relaxes the denition of credibility and
allows (see discussion in Section 7.1) that out of equilibrium beliefs of player two
are dierent from what player one chooses then eciency obtains. Yet neither
game form TP or PT is superior for inducing ecient outcomes. For instance,
eciency emerges in Aumann's Stag Hunt game with talk about intentions (TP)
but not about commitments (PT). On the other hand, eciency emerges in this
3 by 3 game of common interest under talk about commitments but not under
talk about intentions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces some basic no-
tations, the notion of languages and messages. In section 3 we describe the TP
game. In section 4 we describe the PT game. In section 5 we dene credibil-
ity of a language under TP and PT and dene our solution concepts TPE and
PTE and prove their existence. Section 6 contains propositions about selecting
Nash equilibria, sucient condition for eciency, the power of the sender and an
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example demonstrating the power of the interpreter. We also present a simple
game in which TPE does not yield to ecient outcome but PTE does so. Section
7 contains the discussion. We give a weaker version of credibility under TP and
show that it yield to ecient outcome in the previous example, but generally
does not do so. We connect our notion of credibility under PT to the credibility
notion of Rabin (1990) by weakening credibility under PT. We show examples in
which Rabin's (1990) notion is too weak and in which it is too strong compared
to our denition and suggest a stronger version of credibility under PT. We also
discuss the related literature. Section 8 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Underlying Game
Let   be a two player (player one (he), player two (she)) simultaneous move
game with nite action sets Sj and von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
dened by the Bernoulli utilities uj : S1  S2 ! R for player j = 1; 2. For
a nite set X let X be the set of probability distributions over X and let
C () = fx 2 X :  (x) > 0g be the support of  2 X. z 2 R2 is a Nash
equilibrium outcome if there is a Nash equilibrium  2 S1S2 of   such that
uj () = zj for j = 1; 2: z
 is the favorite (pure) Nash equilibrium outcome for
player j if there is no (pure) Nash equilibrium outcome z such that zj > z

j :
Formally, messages are elements of a partition L of S1: This partition is called
a language. Formally, L = fmjm  S1g is a language if 8s1 2 S1; 9!m 2 L such
that s1 2 m. The set of all languages is denoted by L: Languages will be chosen
by the interpreter who is one of the two players. We allow for randomizing over
languages, hence choices in L. A message from L is m 2 L and L(s1) 2 L
denotes the message which contains the action s1. The degenerate language fS1g
that contains a single element can be interpreted as there being no communi-
cation. At the opposite extreme, the language that contains only singletons, so
L (s1) = fs1g for all s1 2 S1; may be interpreted as complete communication.
These two languages will thus be referred to as \no communication" and \com-
plete communication".
We consider two scenarios for when communication takes place. In \rst
talk then play" player one rst sends a message to player two and then both
simultaneously play  : In \rst play then talk" player one rst privately chooses
an action in   and then sends a message to player two after which player two
chooses an action in  :
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3 First Talk Then Play
We rst model communication that occurs before either player chooses an action.
First the interpreter chooses the language L. Then player one sends a message m
from this language L. Conditional on the chosen language and the sent message
player one chooses an action which is not observed by player two. Finally player
two chooses an action.
The above denes the following game, denoted by  TPi for i = 1; 2:
1. Player i (the interpreter) chooses a language L 2 L and communicates it
to the other player.
2. Player one sends a message m 2 L to player two.
3. Player one chooses an action s1 (non-observable for player two)
4. Player two chooses an action s2:
5. Payos are realized, where player j receives payo uj (s1; s2), j = 1; 2:
Let us denote by  TP (L) the game in which L is given and starts with stage
2.
3.1 The Strategies in  TPi
We now introduce the notation for the possibly mixed strategies used in  TPi .
Let Li be the mixed language choice of the interpreter in stage 1, so Li 2 L:
We call Li degenerate if Li puts all weight on a single language. Given language
L 2 L chosen by the interpreter in stage 1 let mL1 2 L be the mixed message
sent by player one in stage 2 and let m1 = (m
L
1 )L2L. Let 
L
1 (m) be the mixed
action of player one in stage 3 after message m 2 L has been sent in stage 2, so
L1 : L ! S1. Concerning player two, let L2 (m) be the mixed action of player
two in stage 3 given the language L chosen by the interpreter in stage 1 and the
message m received in stage 2, so L2 : L ! S2. We write j = (Lj )L2L for
j = 1; 2. Hence, a strategy prole in the game  TPi is a tuple (Li;m1; 1; 2).
4 First Play then Talk
In this scenario we model communication that takes place after player one has
chosen an action. It is analogous to  TPi except the choice of player one is moved
from stage 3 to stage 1. Consider the following game, denoted by  PTi for i = 1; 2:
1. Player one chooses a mixed action 1 2 S1 and privately observes its
realization, an action s1 2 C(1).
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2. Player i (the interpreter) publicly chooses a language L 2 L.
3. Player one sends a message m 2 L to player two.
4. Player two chooses an action s2 2 S2.
5. Payos are realized, where player j receives payo uj (s1; s2), j = 1; 2:
Let us denote by  PT (L) the game above in which the interpreter has to
choose L in stage 2, that is L is xed.
4.1 The Strategies in  PTi
Let 1 2 S1 be the mixed action of player one in stage 1. For i = 1 let
L1 (s1) be the mixed language chosen in stage 2 after action s1 has been realized
in stage 1; L1 : S1 ! L. If player two is the interpreter then L2 2 L
is independent from 1. In equilibrium we will concentrate on language choices
which are independent of the realization of the equilibrium action and always put
all weight on a single language. We say that L1 is degenerate and independent
of 1 if L1(s1) is deterministic for all s1 2 S1 and for all s01; s001 2 C(1) we have
that L1(s
0
1) = L1(s
00
1). Notice that we allow that L1(s
0
1) 6= L1(s001) for (s01; s001) =2
C(1) C(1). We say that L2 is degenerate if L2 is deterministic.
In stage 3; player one chooses a mixed message mL1 belonging to the language
L chosen in stage 2 given that action s1 is the realization of 1 in stage 1; so
mL1 : S1 ! L and m1 = (mL1 )L2L.
In stage 4; player two chooses a mixed action L2 (m) that depends on the
language L chosen in stage 2 and on the message m received in stage 3, so
L2 : L! S2 and 2 = (L2 )L2L.
Hence a strategy prole in the game  PTi is described by (1; Li;m1; 2).
5 Solution Concepts
In this section we frequently refer to the notion of weak-Perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium (Mas Colell et al. (1995)). To x notation let L2 (m) 2 S1 indicate player
two's belief about player one's action after messagem 2 L. Let L2 = (L2 (m))m2L
and 2 = (
L
2 )L2L.
5.1 Credibility
Before dening equilibria in  TPi and  
PT
i we dene the notion of credible lan-
guages under TP and PT.
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Denition 1 We say that a language L is credible under TP if there is a
weak-Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (mL1 ; 
L
1 ; 
L
2 ; 
L
2 ) of  
TP (L) in which player
one always tells the truth, and player two always correctly anticipates player one's
action. That is:
1. for all m 2 L, C(L1 (m))  m and
2. for all m 2 L, L2 (m) 2 m,
3. for all m 2 L, L2 (m) = L1 (m).
Remark 1 L is credible under TP if and only if there is a subgame perfect equi-
librium (mL1 ; 
L
1 ; 
L
2 ) of  
TP (L) in which player one always tells the truth. Note
that condition 2 is superuous, however we keep it to clarify the role of condition
3, namely that we require in addition to telling the truth and believing that player
two always, and not just on the equilibrium path, correctly anticipates player one's
action (point 3). See the weaker denition without point 3 in the discussion in
section 7.1.
Denition 2 We say that a language L is credible under PT if there is a
weak-Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (L1 ;m
L
1 ; 
L
2 ; 
L
2 ) of  
PT (L) in which player
one tells the truth, and player two believes it. That is:
1. for all s1 2 S1, L(s1) 2 argmaxm2Lu1(s1; L2 (m)) and
2. for all m 2 L, L2 (m) 2 m.
The set of credible languages is denoted by C.
5.2 TPE
We now present our equilibrium concept for TP. We search for a weak-PBE of  TPi
in which communication is truthful and believed when the language is credible,
and where messages are ignored otherwise. We denote by 2 = (
L
2 )L2L, where
L2 : L ! S1 and L2 (m) indicates player two's belief about player one's action
after language L and message m 2 L.
Denition 3 (TPE) (Li;m1; 1; 2; 2) is called a talk then play equilib-
rium (TPE) of   if it is a weak-Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of  TPi and:
1. Li is degenerate and credible,
2. if L is credible then for all m 2 L: C(L1 (m))  m and L2 (m) = L1 (m)
(truth-telling and correctly believing),
3. if L is not credible then: L2 (m) = 
fS1g
2 for all m 2 L (ignorance).
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Remark 2 A TPE is a subgame perfect equilibrium of of  TPi with truth-telling
for credible languages and ignorance for non-credible languages.
It is straightforward to show:
Proposition 1 (Existence of TPE) For any   for i = 1; 2 there exists a TPE
of  .
5.3 PTE
Our equilibrium concept for PT is analogous to the one for TP. Communication
is truthful and believed for credible languages, otherwise all messages are ignored.
Denition 4 (PTE) (1; Li;m1; 2; 2) is called a play then talk equilib-
rium (PTE) of   if it is a weak-Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of  PTi and:
1. Li is degenerate, independent of 1 and credible,
2. if L is credible then: for all s1 2 S1, mL1 (s1) = L(s1) and for all m 2 L,
L2 (m) 2 m (truth-telling and believing),
3. if L is not credible then: L2 (m) = 
fS1g
2 for all m 2 L (ignorance).
Proposition 2 (Existence of PTE) For any   for i = 1; 2 there exists a PTE
of  .
Proof: Let i = 1 and consider the favorite Nash equilibrium (1; 2) 2
S1  S2 of player one in  . Let no communication be the candidate for the
equilibrium language. Consider the set C of credible languages. For any credible
language L 2 C which is dierent from no communication and for any m 2 L we
dene L2 (m) in the following way. Consider one of the 
L
2 ; 
L
2 associated to the
weak-Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of  PT (L) under which L is credible. Con-
sider the payo maxs12S1;m2Lu1(s1; 
L
2 (m)). This is a Nash equilibrium payo for
player one given credibility. In fact, this is the weak-Perfect Bayesian outcome
of  PT (L)
Since (1; 2) is the favorite Nash equilibria of player one, we can conclude
that player one cannot benet from deviating to another credible language than
no communication, while choosing a dierent action than 1 and sending some
message from that language.
Finally, we can set L2 (m) = 2 for all L =2 C and for all m 2 L and fS1g2 = 2.
Hence deviations to non credible languages is not protable. For any s1 =2 C(1)
we can set L1(s1) 2 argmaxL2Cu1(s1; L2 (L(s1))).
If i = 2 we can simply choose no communication as the equilibrium language
and (1; 2) to be the favorite equilibrium of player two in  .
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6 Further Propositions
Proposition 3 (Nash equilibrium) For any   the PTE (TPE) outcomes of
 , in which 1 (m1) is pure, are Nash equilibria of  .
Proof: Straightforward.
Remark 3 If 1 (m1) can be mixed then any PTE (TPE) outcome is in the
convex hull of Nash equilibria. The proof is straightforward. Player one may
choose a mixed action in PT and depending on the outcome of his randomization
may send dierent messages. Player two on the equilibrium path correctly believes
player one's action, hence, it must be that Nash equilibria are played after the
dierent messages. This can be the case only if player one is indierent between
the two (or more) Nash equilibria. Similar argument shows that under what
circumstances would player one choose random messages on the equilibrium path
in TP.
Some qualications about the games   for which we state our propositions
are needed. Given   let NE( ) be the set of Nash equilibrium payos of  .
When we say that a payo prole or equilibrium is ecient we mean that there
are no payo prole in NE( ) which (weakly) Pareto dominates it. Let us call
maxs12S1u1(s1; b2(s1)) the Stackelberg payo of player one, where b2 : S1 ! S2 is
player two's best response function which is assumed to be unique. Assume that
there is a unique favorite Nash equilibrium of player one.
Let us dene uTP1 (L); u
PT
1 (L) player one's worst subgame perfect, weak Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium payo in  TP (L); PT (L) (respectively) for some credible
L in which player one tells the truth and player two believes him. Let uTP1 =
maxL2CuTP1 (L) and u
PT
1 = maxL2Cu
PT
1 (L).
Remark 4 For example uTP1 (u
PT
1 ) equals player one's favorite Nash equilibrium
payo if there is a credible language under TP (PT) and a message such that the
unique equilibrium supported within that messages is player one's favorite Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Sender's Power) For any   if i = 1, in any TPE (PTE)
player one must get at least uTP1 ; (u
PT
1 ) and there are TPE (PTE) in which player
one's payo is equal to his Nash equilibrium payo if this payo is larger or equal
to uTP1 (u
PT
1 ).
Proof: For PT it follows from the equilibrium constructed in the proof of
existence. For TP it is straightforward.
The power of the interpreter i = 2: To demonstrate the power of
the interpreter in TP (PT) we exhibit an example where i = 2 and player two,
by choosing complete communication forces player one to communicate all the
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details of his choice, splits the support of the favorite (mixed) equilibrium of
player one and player two gets her best payo. Here the Stackelberg payo is not
the favorite equilibrium of player one.
Player one
Player two
L M R RR
U 1; 1  1; 1  2; 3  1; 2
M  1; 1 1; 1  1; 2  2; 3
Both languages are credible in TP (PT), player one's favorite equilibrium payo
is 0, obtained by mixing equally likely between U and M . But player two will
choose complete communication and get a payo of 2 in all TPE (PTE).
Proposition 5 (Class of games where all TPE are ecient) If   is super-
modular and player one's favorite equilibrium is in pure strategies then all TPE
are ecient if i = 1. If the game is supermodular4 and exhibits diminishing re-
turn and non-degenerate (see Berger (2008)) then all TPE are ecient if i = 1.
(For example in games with positive spill-over, or Cournot with linear demand.
This is not necessarily true for PTE. )
Proof: The rst part is straightforward along the lines of Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), Shannon (1990). All one has to show is that there is a credible
language under TP and a message such that the unique equilibrium supported
within that message is player one's favorite Nash equilibrium. This is the case if
there is another equilibrium of the game such that its support does not contain
player one's favorite Nash equilibrium action, or the game has a unique pure
equilibrium. For the second part, Berger (2008) and Krishna (1992) shows that
any mixed strategy equilibrium can have at most two actions in its support given
diminishing returns. It follows, that player one's favorite equilibrium cannot have
both extreme pure Nash equilibrium in its support hence there is a credible lan-
guage with a message containing only the favorite Nash equilibrium of player one.
We say that a game is self-choosing if for all s1; s
0
1 it is true that u1(s1; b2(s1)) 
u1(s1; b2(s
0
1)), where b2 : S1 ! S2 is player two's best response function. This is
weaker than Baliga and Morris's (2002) notion of self-signalling : for all (s1; s2) 2
S it is true that u1(s1; b2(s1))  u1(s1; s2). We say that a game is of common
interest if for all (s1; s2); (s
0
1; s
0
2) 2 S it is true that u1(s1; s2))  u1(s01; s02) if and
only if u2(s1; s2))  u2(s01; s02). Common interest games are self-signalling and
self-choosing.
Proposition 6 (Class of games where all PTE are ecient) If player one's
favorite equilibrium is in pure strategies and the game is self-choosing or the game
is self-signalling then complete communication is credible and all PTE are e-
cient and player one receives his favorite Nash equilibrium payo.
4Weaker condition might suce.
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Proof: In self-choosing games complete communication is credible. In self-
signalling games the favorite equilibrium of player one is in pure strategies.
6.1 A 3 by 3 Common Interest Game (TP)
The game shown below demonstrates how communication can be useless in TP
even if the game has common interests because only no-communication is credible
under TP; but it yields to eciency in PT as complete communication is credible
under PT.
Player one
Player two
L N R
T 5,5 0,0 -3,-3
M -1,-1 1,1 2,2
B 4,4 -2,-2 3,3
(T; L) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that leads to the unique ecient
outcome.5 It is natural that player one wants to say \I will play T". However,
each of the other two Nash equilibria6 of this game have T in the support of
the corresponding equilibrium strategy of player one.7 This means that player
one cannot truthfully (in TP) communicate that she will not be playing T. Con-
sequently, only ffT;M;Bgg is a credible language. Regardless of who is the
interpreter, nontrivial information about intentions cannot be transmitted under
credible communication in this game.
7 Discussion
7.1 Eciency in Common Interest Games withWeak Cred-
ibility under TP
Now we give a weaker version of credibility under TP (denition 1) which does
not require that player two guesses correctly player one's action after out of
equilibrium messages.
5In fact, T is self-committing and the game satises self-signalling (Farrell, 1986, 1993).
6The Nash equilibria of the examples are computed using a program written by Rahul
Savani. The program is based on the algorithm described in Avis, Rosenberg, Savani, and von
Stengel (2009), and can be found at http://banach.lse.ac.uk/form.html.
7The other two mixed Nash equilibria  and  are given by
1 (T ) = 2=7; 1 (M) = 5=7; 1 (B) = 0; 2 (L) = 1=7; 2 (N) = 6=7; 2 (R) = 0
1 (T ) = 4=15; 1 (M) = 43=60; 1 (B) = 1=60; 2 (L) = 4=15; 2 (N) = 31=60; 2 (R) = 13=60
with corresponding outcomes 5=7 and 41=60:
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Denition 5 We say that a language L is weakly-credible under TP if there is
a (mL1 ; 
L
1 ; 
L
2 ; 
L
2 ) weak-Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of  
TP (L) in which player
one always tells the truth, and player two always believes it. That is:
1. for all m 2 L, C(L1 (m))  m and
2. for all m 2 L, L2 (m) 2 m.
Requiring only weak perfect Bayesian is weaker than subgame perfection and
hence allows for more credible languages. In the common interest game in section
6.1 ffTg; fM;Bgg is weakly-credible. If player one says fM;Bg player two can
believe it by putting not too much weight on B and play R. Player one then
is telling the truth because he plays B. Hence weak-TPE yields eciency if we
allow incorrect out of equilibrium beliefs when dening credibility under TP and
in point 2 of denition of TPE. In fact, this is true in general:
Remark 5 In common interest games weak-TPE are ecient. It can namely be
shown that the language which contains two messages fTg and S1 n fTg (where
T is the action of player one yielding the best outcome) is weakly credible or the
game has a single pure strategy equilibrium.
7.2 Ineciency with Weak Credibility under TP
If we change the payo (-3,-3) to (4,-3) after (T;R) in the common interest game
above we still have multiple Nash equilibria each containing T in its support.
The game is still of self-choosing hence PT yields to ecient outcome. However,
ffTg; fM;Bgg is not weakly-credible under TP anymore. It is natural that player
one wants to say \I will play T". But he cannot do so in equilibrium, because
after the message fM;Bg player two either plays L or R no matter what he
believes in fM;Bg. But then in both cases player one plays T which is out of
fM;Bg. This means that player one cannot truthfully (in TP) communicate that
she will not be playing T. Similarly after message M player two must believe M
and play R but then player one plays T . After message B player two must play
L and then player one plays T . Consequently, only ffT;M;Bgg is a weakly-
credible language. Regardless of who is the interpreter, nontrivial information
about intentions cannot be transmitted under weakly-credible communication in
this game.
7.3 Rabin's Credibility and Credibility under PT
We compare our notion of credibilty in PT to that of Rabin (1990). Rabin (1990)
denes the notion of a Credible Message Prole (CMP) for simple communication
games (sender-receiver games) with prior p over the types T of the sender. He
does so by starting from a large enough message set M such that for each X  T
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there is an exclusive set of messages M(X) M such that M(Xi) \M(Xj) = ;
holds for all Xi 6= Xj. To simplify exposition identify subsets of T with messages,
thus sending X has the meaning that "my type is in X". So the language is
described by the power set of T as opposed to a partition as in our case. Focus
is on a subset of messages called a message prole X = fX1; : : : ; XDg where
Xi\Xj = ;. Through denitions 1 till 6 Rabin (1990) denes when X is a CMP.
Broadly speaking, a message prole is a CMP if for each message belonging to X
received by the receiver, given that the receiver believes that she faces the types
in the message, each type in the message gets his best payo. In particular,
messages within X are believed even if they are sent by types outside [Di=1Xi.
Now consider PT as a sender receiver game in which the sender, player one
can choose his own type. We identify the sender with player one, T with S1 and
the receiver with player two. Rabin (1990) investigates which types can tell the
truth, allowing others to lie. Our approach however builds on an understanding
of communication in which all types can be believed. One reason is that types are
endogenous in this paper. We consider credibility of a single sender while Rabin
has many dierent senders, identied by their types. Hence, we only concentrate
on CMP-s which are partitions (languages in our sense) of T .
Our denition of credible languages uses equilibria of the enlarged games
 PT (L) which relies on disciplined beliefs on the equilibrium path. Consider an
alternative denition that does not refer to an equilibrium in which a language is
called credible if player two can form beliefs within the messages such that no
matter which action was chosen by player one, it is optimal for player one to tell
the truth, given that player two plays optimally given her beliefs. Clearly, if a
language is credible under PT then it is credible under PT. Moreover, complete
communication is credible if and only if it is credible.
Beliefs after messages containing a single action are xed. Hence, one could
hope that communication leads Nash equilibrium play when this involves player
one choosing a single action. But player one may want to choose a dierent
action and still tell the truth (by sending a vague message) and deviate from
the candidate equilibrium. It is easy to construct examples which show that
crediblility is too weak in the sense that player one can manipulate player two
and achieve his best (non equilibrium) payo in the game.
Non-existence of equilibrium with credible languages:
Player one
Player two
L M R RR
U 1; 1 0; 0 0; 0 0; 0
M 0; 1  3; 1 5; 0 0; 2
D  1; 1  2; 2 0; 0  3; 1
(U;L) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. But (U;L) cannot be the
outcome of any PTE. The language L = ffUg; fM;Dgg is credible under PT
if we choose L2 (fM;Dg) = (; 1  ) 2 fM;Dg so that L2 (fM;Dg)(R) = 1 is
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a best response to this belief, that is player two plays R optimally after message
fM;Dg. But then player one will chooseM instead of U and receive a payo of 5.
No other languages, but no communication is credible. However, ffUg; fM;Dgg
is not credible under PT. It follows that one must further restrict the set of
credible languages.
Rabin (1990) oers a stronger8 notion of credibility for sender receiver games
in terms of credible message proles, described above. His denition is clearly not
applicable directly to our setting because player one (the sender) can choose his
type. However, we immediately have the following observation. If L is a CMP
then it is credible. Notice also, that ffUg; fM;Dgg is a CMP for an open set of
priors in the example above and so CMP appears weaker than credibility under
PT.
Further interesting comparisons can be made when considering complete com-
munication. In particular, if complete communication is a CMP then it is also
credible under PT. For self-signalling games complete communication is a CMP.
There are games where complete communication is credible under PT but it is
not a CMP (see Example 2 in Rabin (1990)). This and the observation above
suggests that if player one can choose his type optimally before communication
takes place then it allows for more precise communication compared to standard
sender receiver setups. However, CMP is neither weaker nor stronger than credi-
bility under PT (see the example above). This is because, the choice of action in
PT gives more possibility to communicate but the requirement that beliefs must
be correct on the equilibrium path (which is not an issue in CMP) restricts the
possibilities of credible communication. It is easy to nd a condition which guar-
antees that whenever a language is a CMP then the language is credible under
PT, though we have found it too restrictive.
Our framework gives interesting possibility to analyze situations in which
player one wants to "pool" some of his actions when playing a mixed equilibrium.
In particular, in  PT1 we require that the language is chosen optimally after each
action of player one. Mixing can be interesting out of equilibrium as well, once we
further restrict player two's out of equilibrium beliefs for credible languages, for
example by requiring the existence of a proper9 equilibrium of  PT (L) in which
player one tells the truth.
7.4 Related Literature
Farrell (1986, 1993) pioneered the communication literature in which messages
have an intrinsic meaning. Typically communication is about private information,
the stereotypical model is a sender-receiver game introduced by Crawford and
8Rabin (1990) argues that in some situation it is rather weak. Indeed, ffUg; fM;Dgg is a
CMP for an open set of priors.
9No other equilibrium concept has bite on out of equilibrium beliefs in  PT (L). Properness
in  PT (L) is very similar to subgame perfection in  TP (L).
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Sobel (1992). In the literature on neologisms, unexpected messages are checked in
terms of their credibility (self-signalling), with reasoning becoming more involved
when more than one message passes this test (e.g. see Matthews et al., 1991).
Baliga and Morris (2002) conduct a formal game theoretic analysis, thus avoiding
plausibility checks. In contrast to Baliga and Morris (2002), we incorporate choice
of language and allow for partial information revelation. Moreover, under \rst
play then talk", private information is endogenous.
There are only few papers where communication is about intentions and mes-
sages have meaning, as we model in \rst talk then play". Farrell (1988) in-
vestigates communication about intentions in the light of rationalizability, albeit
adding additional plausibility requirements and not formally dening beliefs. Lo
(2007) formally analyzes elimination of weakly dominated strategies for a rich
class of messages, providing intricate conditions for ruling out messages that are
\opposite" to each other. She nds that a unique outcome is selected in Battle
of Sexes but not in Aumann's Stag Hunt game, the latter result being dicult
to interpret. Farrell and Rabin (1996) rst treat intentions as if they are private
information, requiring self-signalling, and then add a condition (self-committing)
that ensures that players behave according to their intentions. According to our
formalization, self-signalling is not relevant for communication about intentions.
Ellingsen and Ostling (2010) show for the level k model that there is always
more coordination on pure Nash equilibria when there is one way communica-
tion. Demichelis and Weibull (2008) consider evolution in symmetric games under
two-sided communication.
Truth can be incorporated in dierent ways, as seen in the papers highlighted
above. Neologisms build on informal plausibility arguments. Baliga and Morris
(2002) restrict attention to equilibria in which all information is transmitted.
Other approaches include Chen (2004) who assumes that senders tell the truth
with positive probability and Kartik et al. (2007) where there is a cost of telling a
lie. In our paper we assume that the receiver believes that the sender tells truth,
provided this is possible under the given language. Otherwise both behave as if
there is a single message when truth-telling trivially holds. In contrast to Baliga
and Morris (2002) this also puts discipline on out of equilibrium behavior.10
There is a closely related paper by Zultan (2012), albeit where messages have
no meaning, in which a game with multiple selves is proposed to account for
the ndings of Charness (2000). Informally it is claimed that a standard game-
theoretic model will not suce. The focus is on sequential equilibria in which
information is transmitted. These do not exist if the action is chosen before the
message is sent, but exist if the message is sent rst. Note that this does not
mirror the ndings of Charness (2000), even if one assumes that players select
10Note that Baliga and Morris (2002) do not to consider the complete information setting
(talk about intentions) as they nd it dicult to formalize their intutions in that context (see
page 467 in their paper).
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among those equilibria in which information is transmitted. This is because
inecient equilibria exist in which information is transmitted when the message
is sent rst.11
There is also experimental evidence that adding one-sided pre-play communi-
cation increases eciency (see Cooper et al. (1989, 1992), Blume and Ortmann
(2007)).
8 Conclusion
Interestingly, despite the large literature on communication in games, we seem
to be the rst to use an equilibrium analysis to investigate the impact of truthful
communication under pre-play communication (as modelled in our \rst talk then
play" scenario). Truthful does not mean that players are forced to tell the truth.
It means that the sender is able to convince the receiver whenever he can be
believed. We call this credible communication. Our ndings show that eciency
is not guaranteed in common interest games that have more than two strategies
per player. The debate raised by Aumann also necessitates that we present a
model in which communication occurs during play, called \rst play then talk".
This model has its own value as it is the rst step to understanding communi-
cation while playing extensive form games of imperfect information. Results in
the two models are very dierent and are useful to highlight how communication
inuences outcomes. They are both very tractable when analyzing specic games
and can help understand in applications which equilibria have good properties.
After all, parties will typically communicate and this should be considered for-
mally when making predictions, instead of using it only as a motivation like in
the literature on renegotiation.
Clearly communication as modelled in this paper is very specic. Once our
modelling approach is well received we believe it to be important to tackle various
extensions. We nd it valuable, thereby contrasting the modelling of Baliga
and Morris (2002), to allow for general messages and to identify all equilibria
with truth-telling, and not just those where all information is transmitted. In
other words, we wish to predict outcomes in games, not to understand when all
information can be transmitted. Other extensions that are easy to implement
include considering the case where player two is uncertain about whether or
not player one has already committed to an action and considering an n player
game where only player one communicates to the others. Extensions that require
more thought in terms of making the right modelling choice include two-sided
communication.
11Let players coordinate on the mixed Nash equilibrium when message m is sent. If any other
message is sent assume that they coordinate on the inecient pure strategy Nash equilbrium.
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